Using the commenter’s example: let’s say that Jones sees Smith being brutally being beaten by Jackson. At that point, Jones has really only three option.

1) he can take a direct hand in helping Smith
2) he can take an indirect hand in helping Smith (i.e. try to get someone else to help, whether it’s other people, security, etc)
3) he can ignore what is taking place completely.

I would argue that the first two choices are moral, while the third option violates the non-aggression principle in spirit, if not in name. If you think about what the non-aggression principle says:

“No one may threaten or commit violence (’aggress’) against another man’s person or property. Violence may be employed only against the man who commits such violence; that is, only defensively against the aggressive violence of another. In short, no violence may be employed against a nonaggressor.” (Rothbard)

There is no imperative to act, as written, and that is understood. But I would argue that the spirit of the non-aggression prinicipal DOES have one imperative, and one imperative only: when it is in your power to prevent an aggressive act against another person, you have a moral duty to do so. It doesn’t have to be direct, as I mentioned (i.e. calling the security forces is just as much help as directly taking action), but I think wilfully ignoring a situation can be just as much construed as aggression… and I say that based on intent.

Going back to example. Let’s say that Jones wasn’t in the picture, and it was just Jackson beating up Jones. Clearly, Jackson then holds full responsibility. But if Smith is aware of what’s happening and does nothing, then wouldn’t Smith be a de facto actor in the situation?

It goes back to the idea that there is no such thing as inaction — for even inaction is action itself (the argument being that all choices are actions, so a choice to not act is still an action by default).

Now, not to break Godwin’s Law too early here, but take an example from Nazi Germany. As an outsider looking in, would you hold someone who knew about Auschwitz, and what was going on there, but didn’t say anything, accountable? Aren’t there plenty of situations where we are morally culpable, even if we aren’t directly involved in the initiation of an action?

So, taking that tack with Chevron, could we not say that Chevron is violating the non-aggression principal through willful ignorance?

I’d argue that they are. Businesses are just as accountable to non-aggression as individual actors are. If an action by Chevron is contributing to someone else’s direct aggression, and Chevron is aware of that, then by proxy I’d argue they are culpable as well.

As much as I hate to use a Statist example (particularly one from the so-called “war on terror” and the Bush Admin), there is a particularly apt example in funding terrorism.

If I am contributing to a charity, and the news hits that this particular charity is funneling money to known terrorist organizations, then I’d not be liable. After all, I didn’t know that this charity was funneling money, and when I found out, I stopped my contribution.

However, if I didn’t stop, aren’t I making a choice to continue? Doesn’t that choice raise me to the point of being liable?

Anyway, please excuse the rambling nature of my post — written between phone calls at work!

Thanks,

-olly