Followup on natural rights
Saturday, April 3rd, 2010For your review and critique, some followup on this post — a snippet of conversation from this morning on Facebook:
A correspondent:
The whole notion of ‘rights’ is absurd — ‘ethics’ is a function of human emotion, and not of logic or reasoning or ‘truth.’
Myself:
While the matter of what people might individually value is subjective (as well as their ordinal preferences among values), whether or not a value has been attained is a yes or no question.
I want a ham sandwich. That’s a subjective preference. Do I have a ham sandwich? No. That’s a fact.
Correspondent:
Does that have anything to do with ‘rights?’
Myself:
If “good” contra “bad” is understood to mean, in a secular sense, achieving/maximising the attainment of values (not merely in a sense of literal material goods, but the goals of any goal directed action) among the population generally…
Then there *is* an empirical basis for the concept that development of a consensus on bounds of behavior that don’t overlap (spheres of free action, or “rights”) is “good”.
Either values get achieved or they don’t. That the basis of value selection is subjective has no relevance to the factual question of whether or not goals/values are being achieved.
Correspondent:
The point, though, is that ethics is still necessarily just a function of human sentiment — no meta-ethical theory can save us from this. Why? … you can’t adopt one meta-ethical theory over another … except by comparing how well they align with your own personal sentiments. A disagreement in matters of ‘ethics’ is more like a disagreement over what type of art is more beautiful than a disagreement over a question that actually has some type of logically true answer (like, say, mathematics).
Myself:
re: “you can’t adopt one meta-ethical theory over another … except by comparing how well they align with your own personal sentiments.”
I think I just sketched a basis for how you can. Perhaps you can show me my error.
Either people are achieving their values or they aren’t (i.e. either they’re free or they aren’t — although not exactly the same thing, we can treat it that way for now).
Perhaps they *are* achieving values I disapprove of.
From an evolutionary standpoint, a framework of maximising attainment of values by the species (or population of allied species) generally would seem to trump my own personal preferences for which values other people ought to be seeking.
A different correspondent:
I really don’t want to get into this debate, but then how is one to decide a sense of value based on those sentiments. For example if a group of people sincerely want to kill a set of X people for an arbitrary feature. Would you not say this desire/emotion is less valuable than a group of people who want to feed the hungry?
Myself:
Clearly the people being killed are not achieving their values.
…
It just doesn’t seem all that controversial to me that maximising value/goal attainment among a population generally is done by development of a social consensus on bounds of behavior to minimize conflicting behavior.
A third correspondent:
If I could achieve all my values by convincing others that they are objective, I would gladly do it, but that still wouldn’t make it so.
Myself:
But I’m not asserting that values are objective — only that it’s an objective fact that they have been attained or not in any given case.









