That something is this…

Libertarian ethics add another layer to thought about society, by describing the circumstances when violence is appropriate and when it isn’t (as well as by contributing the related recognition that the state is institutionalized violence). By focusing solely on what state policy ought and ought not be, what gets ignored is the ability to build positive law in a stateless society. Positive law in a statist society is tyrannical because it is imposed coercively. Positive law in a stateless society would be libertarian — built contractually and through free association in response to non-violent methods of persuasion.

In other words, the serious libertarian (i.e. agorist) recognizes not only that social evils such as racism ought to be opposed, but that an important principle must shape the character of that opposition — resulting in use of either violent or non-violent means as may be appropriate to the particular case under consideration.

ADDENDUM, 5/21/2010: See also this comment by RadGeek.

Rather, it would indicate the advocate of open competition is aware of some things others are not:

1) That attempting to order society by means of systematic death threats and calling it “law” has nothing to do with shoes and everything to do with exploitation by a ruling class.

2) That shoe policy doesn’t have to be something society divides up into political parties to constantly war back and forth about.

3) That we can have plenty of shoes if we give slavery the boot.

Me being close to you necessarily implies that you, likewise, are close to me. There’s no getting around that for Georgists. Sorry.

A correspondent:

The whole notion of ‘rights’ is absurd — ‘ethics’ is a function of human emotion, and not of logic or reasoning or ‘truth.’

Myself:

While the matter of what people might individually value is subjective (as well as their ordinal preferences among values), whether or not a value has been attained is a yes or no question.

I want a ham sandwich. That’s a subjective preference. Do I have a ham sandwich? No. That’s a fact.

Correspondent:

Does that have anything to do with ‘rights?’

Myself:

If “good” contra “bad” is understood to mean, in a secular sense, achieving/maximising the attainment of values (not merely in a sense of literal material goods, but the goals of any goal directed action) among the population generally…

Then there *is* an empirical basis for the concept that development of a consensus on bounds of behavior that don’t overlap (spheres of free action, or “rights”) is “good”.

Either values get achieved or they don’t. That the basis of value selection is subjective has no relevance to the factual question of whether or not goals/values are being achieved.

Correspondent:

The point, though, is that ethics is still necessarily just a function of human sentiment — no meta-ethical theory can save us from this. Why? … you can’t adopt one meta-ethical theory over another … except by comparing how well they align with your own personal sentiments. A disagreement in matters of ‘ethics’ is more like a disagreement over what type of art is more beautiful than a disagreement over a question that actually has some type of logically true answer (like, say, mathematics).

Myself:

re: “you can’t adopt one meta-ethical theory over another … except by comparing how well they align with your own personal sentiments.”

I think I just sketched a basis for how you can. Perhaps you can show me my error.

Either people are achieving their values or they aren’t (i.e. either they’re free or they aren’t — although not exactly the same thing, we can treat it that way for now).

Perhaps they *are* achieving values I disapprove of.

From an evolutionary standpoint, a framework of maximising attainment of values by the species (or population of allied species) generally would seem to trump my own personal preferences for which values other people ought to be seeking.

A different correspondent:

I really don’t want to get into this debate, but then how is one to decide a sense of value based on those sentiments. For example if a group of people sincerely want to kill a set of X people for an arbitrary feature. Would you not say this desire/emotion is less valuable than a group of people who want to feed the hungry?

Myself:

Clearly the people being killed are not achieving their values.

…

It just doesn’t seem all that controversial to me that maximising value/goal attainment among a population generally is done by development of a social consensus on bounds of behavior to minimize conflicting behavior.

A third correspondent:

If I could achieve all my values by convincing others that they are objective, I would gladly do it, but that still wouldn’t make it so.

Myself:

But I’m not asserting that values are objective — only that it’s an objective fact that they have been attained or not in any given case.

You won’t find “natural rights” or the number pi in the periodic table of the elements — but both bridges and societies will stand or fall based on how well such intangible aspects of reality are understood.

“Do you really believe that if we were to topple the current administration or government (which won’t happen), people would agree to re-establish it with nothing?”

I took “people would agree to re-establish it with nothing” to mean “people [generally] wouldn’t re-establish a government?”

My reply:

You apparently have me confused with Clark Kent if you don’t realize the only way I could, myself, conceivably topple the government is by convincing enough people to make themselves ungovernable by *any* government in the first place.

See also: Rothbard’s Button

A CHALLENGE TO THE TEA PARTIES: EMBRACE THE CLASS STRUGGLE

To the grassroots members of the tea parties,

Many of you are rightly angry over the U.S. government’s health care bill that was recently passed despite massive public opposition. Big Business lobbied to get this awful legislation through. They aim to get wealthy at your expense, using awful government policies, and tax dollars taken from you against your will, to make you buy their product — at gunpoint, figuratively speaking.

This so-called health care bill is top-down class warfare. Isn’t it time you started fighting back?

We’re not talking about the old, worn out Marxist idea of class struggle between simply the rich and the poor. The real class struggle is between the makers and the takers. The makers are you — the productive class, both workers and honest business people. The takers are the politically favored elite, from both government and business, that get rich by means of special favors from the government and tax dollars. The takers can also be called the political class. They’re parasites. They don’t earn their wealth. They use government to take it from the makers, the productive class.

Both major political parties work for the political class. Regular politics won’t fix this problem. Regular politics made this problem. Remember how many Republicans voted for the bank and auto bailouts? You can’t trust a Republican not to double-cross you once they get elected.

What should be done, since regular protests get ignored by the politicians and voting won’t help?

Go over the politicians heads to the people they really work for — the political class. In the case of the health care bill, we’re talking about the heads of insurance companies that stand to make enormous artificial profits from the awful legislation. They brought this upon you. It’s their fault. They made it happen. You can find out who they are. Do your own research. Do some digging.

We suggest targeting both senior management and controlling investors of such companies with non-violent civil resistance campaigns. Below, you’ll find a list of 198 methods of non-violent action useful for radical campaigns of any sort. Give ‘em hell. Tell them to have their bought-and-paid-for pet politicians back off.

Who are we? We’re the Alliance of the Libertarian Left. To find out more about us, visit our web site — www.all-left.net

198 METHODS OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION

The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion

Formal Statements
1. Public Speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

Communications with a Wider Audience
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting

Group Representations
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

Symbolic Public Acts
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures

Pressures on Individuals
31. “Haunting” officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

Drama and Music
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing

Processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

Honoring the Dead
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

Public Assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and Renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one’s back

The Methods of Social Noncooperation

Ostracism of Persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

Withdrawal from the Social System
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. “Flight” of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: Economic Boycotts

Actions by Consumers
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott

Action by Workers and Producers
78. Workmen’s boycott
79. Producers’ boycott

Action by Middlemen
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott

Action by Owners and Management
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ “general strike”

Action by Holders of Financial Resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money

Action by Governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo

The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: The Strike

Symbolic Strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

Agricultural Strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm Workers’ strike

Strikes by Special Groups
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners’ strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary Industrial Strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted Strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting “sick” (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

Multi-Industry Strikes
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown

The Methods of Political Noncooperation

Rejection of Authority
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

Citizens’ Noncooperation with Government
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government departments, agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

Citizens’ Alternatives to Obedience
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws

Action by Government Personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by
enforcement agents
148. Mutiny

Domestic Governmental Action
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

International Governmental Action
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations

The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention

Psychological Intervention
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
a) Fast of moral pressure
b) Hunger strike
c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment

Physical Intervention
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

Social Intervention
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

Economic Intervention
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

Political Intervention
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government

Source: Sharp, Gene. The Politics of Nonviolent Action (3 Vols.), Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973.

The Professional Revolutionary: A Profile

Dr. Mostafa Rejai

A UNIQUE phenomenon of the twentieth century, the professional revolutionary provides an endless source of fascination for both scholarly and popular imagination. Observers with a romantic outlook portray the professional revolutionary as pure, virtuous, and idealist–as a heroic fighter for humanity, freedom, and justice. Those with a cynical cast of mind see the professional revolutionary as fanatical, psychopathic, and criminal–as a failure in a society the complete destruction of which alone would yield proper revenge. As we shall see, however, neither view is valid.

The genesis of the concept of professional revolutionary is found in Lenin (What Is To Be Done? 1902), who was also the first to personify it. Lenin defined the primary need of a revolutionary movement in terms of a secret, small, tightly knit, highly disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries–that is, men who devote their entire life to revolution, who turn revolution into a calling, a vocation, a mission.

The nationalist and revolutionary movements of the twentieth century have catapulted into prominence a host of professional revolutionaries in addition to Lenin. What do these diverse men have in common, and why/how did they become professional revolutionaries?

This, treatment of the professional revolutionary derives from a much larger study of 64 prominent revolutionary leaders from 12 major revolutions of the past. These revolutions occurred in England (1640s), America (1776), France (1789), Mexico (1910), Russia (1917), China (1949), Bolivia (1952), North Vietnam (1954), Hungary (1956), Cuba (1959), Algeria (1962), and France (1968).

Among the 64 leaders are 14 individuals who meet the requirement for professional revolutionary. They are Nikolai Lenin, Joseph Stalin, Leon Trotsky, and Grigori Zinoviev of Russia; Chu Teh, Lui Shao-ch’i, Lin Piao, and Mao Tse-tung of China; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Troung Chinh, and Vo Nguyen Giap of North Vietnam; Fidel Castro and Ernesto Guevara of Cuba. There are undoubtedly other professional revolutionaries, but these fourteen individuals are the basis for a composite profile in the pages that follow. It goes without saying that not every individual embraces every trait identified.

THE professional. revolutionary is born in an urban setting or, if born in a rural area, experiences early and sustained exposure to urban life. The impulse to revolution, in other words, originates in urban centers, though subsequently it may be “exported” to the countryside. The urban milieu introduces the professional revolutionary to a variety of radical ideologies in his late teens or early twenties. By the age of twenty-five, he is virtually certain to have taken actual part in revolutionary agitation and organization.

The professional revolutionary comes from a middle or lower class family with a relatively large number of siblings. Although probability considerations would dictate otherwise, he is more likely to be an oldest or a youngest rather than a middle child. He typically comes from the main ethnic and religious groupings in his society; on occasion, however, he may represent a minority group, most likely Jewish. As time passes, his religious affiliation–whatever its origins–takes a sharp turn to atheism.

The professional revolutionary is probably reasonably well educated. This education takes place in public institutions, which brings him into contact with a spectrum of population not found in private or parochial schools. He is almost certain to have gone through high school and quite likely to have had college experience or professional training in such fields as medicine, law, education, the military, or the ministry. Regardless of the nature and extent of his education, the professional revolutionary is likely to be a prolific writer, chiefly on matters of revolutionary theory and practice. As such, he can be labeled an “intellectual.”

While his education may qualify him for one of the established professions, the professional revolutionary does not take his occupation seriously. Thus, for example, Lenin obtained a law degree but hardly practiced law; Guevara was a physician who never practiced; and Mao, Ho, and Giap all taught school for only short periods of time. The only exception to this rule is the military profession, which is necessarily taken with utter seriousness. In fact, should he lack formal military training as a requisite component of his skills, the professional revolutionary acquires military experience in the course of the revolution in informal ways.

While there is some likelihood that he participates in established political institutions and processes–in order either to manipulate or subvert them–the professional revolutionary is irreversibly committed to radical organization and agitation. He is also quite likely to have a lengthy record of arrest, imprisonment, or exile.

The professional revolutionary is a cosmopolite: he travels widely, gaining extensive exposure to foreign cultures, values, traditions, and languages. This diversity of foreign exposure accounts, in part, for the eclectic nature and origin of the ideology to which the professional revolutionary subscribes. Building on the experiences of his predecessors and counterparts in other societies, synthesizing a variety of beliefs and values, the professional revolutionary adapts foreign ideologies to the conditions and needs of his own country. In general, he is most likely to fuse shades of Marxism (including Marxism-Leninism or communism) with forms of nationalism. When combined, these two doctrines have proved the most explosive revolutionary ideology of the twentieth century.

As a rule, the professional revolutionary is optimistic about the “nature of man.” He sees man as basically good and rational but oppressed by and alienated from the society in which he lives. Hence, revolution becomes an act of total liberation.

Similarly, the professional revolutionary maintains a highly positive attitude toward his own country, as his nationalist ideology virtually requires. On the other hand, his image of the international society is dualistic: he sees the world in terms of “friends” to be cultivated and “enemies” to be fought.

WHAT life experiences account for the emergence of the professional revolutionary?

He probably led a stormy childhood characterized by early rebelliousness, parental conflicts, or loss of one or both parents. He is likely to have been born to a large family, and he tends to be either the oldest or the youngest, son. What accounts for the preponderance of oldest and youngest children among professional revolutionaries? Recent findings in the field of child psychology cast some light on the subject.1

Oldest sons are typically held to strict standards of competence and achievement. As a result, they tend to attain eminence in their chosen endeavors, revolution included. Moreover, oldest sons are likely to experience intense feelings of anxiety over the loss of parental affection/attention once siblings begin to arrive. Coupled with this anxiety are intense feelings of guilt over the hostilities they exhibit toward their siblings. Externalizing and politicizing these feelings of anxiety, hostility, and guilt–even to the point of revolutionary action–may be a way of managing one’s psychic balance.

Youngest children are more striving and defiant toward their siblings–and probably toward the world in general. They are more competitive and more vigilant in an effort to maintain their status and possessions in the cruel world that a large family may represent. Their perception of relative parental neglect and deprivation may generate impulses toward rebellion. Being highly group-oriented, youngest children may see revolutionary movements as a means of maintaining and augmenting their sense of identity and belongingness.

In contrast to all this, middle children are not subjected to the strict parental codes and norms of behavior that are applied to the first-born. Middle children are better adjusted and satisfied with their lives than either the oldest or the youngest ones. Understandably, they do not seek radical social change.

The professional revolutionary carries the rebelliousness and conflicts of his childhood on to school, where processes of radicalization gain fresh momentum. Exposed to a variety of persons and views but associating mostly with his own kind, he has his horizons broadened, his consciousness enhanced, and his intellectual development gains pace. He is typically found in the forefront of agitation, boycotting classes, leading student strikes, and the like.

The radicalization of the professional revolutionary is completed in foreign travels. He becomes cosmopolitan in many ways: he gains exposure to a variety of cultures and ideologies, personally experiences or witnesses varying modes of oppression and exploitation, shares experiences with other revolutionaries, and develops a set of standards against which to judge his own society.

THE development of the professional revolutionary is also marked by the evolution of a set of psychological attributes. To begin with, the professional revolutionary is driven by a sense of justice/injustice and a corresponding attempt to set things right. This sense of justice/injustice may be personally rooted; it may be perceived in societal conditions, or it may be personally based and projected outward onto the larger society. Whatever form it may take, the sense of justice/injustice is present in a most conspicuous fashion.

The professional revolutionary is motivated by nationalism and patriotism. He may seek to maintain the independence and integrity of his nation. He may set but to free his nation from the oppression and exploitation of another nation. He may wish to improve the status, prosperity, and prestige of his country.

The professional revolutionary is vain, egotistical, ‘intent on gaining recognition of his personal superiority. He may have delusions of grandeur, seeing himself as an extraordinary man driven by sublime moral principles and called on by a higher order to bring liberty, equality, and fraternity to humankind. In undertaking all this, the professional revolutionary seeks symbolic immortality.2

The professional revolutionary is ascetic, austere, and puritanical. Self-discipline, self-reliance, self-denial, and relentless emphasis on hard work set him apart from ordinary beings. Accordingly, his demand for “virtue” is ceaseless, chronic, and compelling. Evil and corrupt as he finds the existing society, he feels called on to replace sin, greed, and lust with temperance, industry, and purity.

The professional revolutionary tends to be a marginal man in his society, that is, he may deviate in important ways from accepted social norms. This marginality may be physical, social, or psychological. The professional revolutionary may experience bitter personal humiliation, particularly in colonial contexts. He may be scolded in school for being a member of a minority group or coming from a peasant background. Similarly, he may be berated for physical disfigurement of various kinds: unusual features, scarred face, or short stature. In any event, frustrated and humiliated, the professional revolutionary compensates for his marginality by projecting his feelings of inferiority and low self-esteem outward onto the larger society.

The vain, ascetic, austere, marginal professional revolutionary has a gentle side as well: he probably possesses qualities of aestheticism and romanticism. He may be a lover of literature and philosophy (Trotsky, Ho, Guevara), or a lover of poetry (Guevara), or, indeed, he may be a poet in his own right (Mao). He may be a nature lover (Mao). He may have a passion for music (Lenin).

THE professional revolutionary is particularly adept at developing and deploying two elements that are crucial determinants of revolutionary success Of failure: ideology and organization.

Revolutionary ideology has three components: (1) a thorough-going critique of the existing order as inhuman and immoral; (2) a depiction of an alternative, superior order embodying positive values of liberty, equality, and fraternity; and (3) a statement of plans and programs intended to realize the alternative order.

Deploying such an ideology, the professional revolutionary undermines the confidence and morale of the ruling regime, rationalizes and legitimizes the need for revolution, politicizes and mobilizes the masses, enhances the followers’ sense of cohesion and solidarity, and elicits commitment and devotion. He does not adopt an inflexible or purist ideological posture but deliberately dilutes and soft-pedals ideology in order to maximize popular support and make room for maneuver and compromise. He is pragmatic and opportunistic.

Organization is a fundamental adjunct to ideology, the link between ideology and action. The professional revolutionary translates ideology into action thr9ugh the medium of organization. Ide910gy helps “reach” the masses; organization functions to tap their energies and channel them toward the realization of revolutionary objectives.

Deploying political, military, and paramilitary organizations, the professional revolutionary eventually launches an offensive on all fronts. He coordinates a program of: (1) maintaining close contacts with the masses; (2) continuing to politicize and mobilize them by means of distributing incentives or punishment, as appropriate; (3) recruiting, socializing, and training cadres and fighters; (4) fighting the battles that need to be fought; (5) gathering maximum intelligence about the enemy; and (6) unleashing a sustained policy of terror and violence that may eventually topple the existing regime.

WHILE the professional revolutionary is a definite personality type, he is neither uniformly noble nor uniformly evil. When combined, the romantic and the cynical views of the professional revolutionary hold a degree of validity. Alone, neither is capable of accounting for this unique phenomenon of our age. The professional revolutionary is a distinctive product of a set of circumstances, a variety of complex and sometimes contradictory attributes, a series of life experiences, a host of psychological dynamics, and an array of ideological and organizational skills.

The professional revolutionary is an outgrowth of increasing urbanization, rapid developments in communication and transportation, the trend toward universal education, and diffusion of revolutionary ideologies. In a word, ironical as it may be, the professional revolutionary is an inescapable by-product of the very modernity that has been a distinguishing mark of the twentieth century.

Miami University, Ohio

Notes

1. Cf. Lucille Forer and Henry Still, The Birth Order Factor (New York, 1976).

2. Cf. Robert J. Lifton, Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution (New York, 1968).

Contributor

Mostafa Rejai (Ph.D., University of California, Los Angeles) is Professor of Political Science at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. He is author of The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy (1977) and Leaders of Revolution (1979), and his articles and reviews have appeared in professional journals in the United States and Europe. Dr. Rejai is a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and an associate editor of Journal of Political and Military Sociology.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

My second political difference with Spooner-Tucker is on the land question, specifically on the question of property rights in land title. Here, however, I believe that the Tucker position is superior to that of current laissez-faire economists who either take no position on land or else blithely assume that all land titles must be protected simply because some government has declared them “private property”; and superior to the Henry Georgists, who recognize the existence of a land problem but who deny the justice of any private property in ground land. The thesis of the individualist anarchists, developed by Joshua K. Ingalls, was that private ownership of land should be recognized only in those who themselves are using the specific areas of land. Such a theory of property would automatically abolish all rent payments for land, since only the direct user of a piece of land would be recognized as its owner.

While I strongly disagree with this doctrine, it does supply a useful corrective to those libertarians and laissez-faire economists who refuse to consider the problem of land monopoly in the State’s arbitrary granting of land titles to its favorites, and therefore who fail completely to tackle what is probably the number one problem in the undeveloped countries today. It is not enough to call simply for defense of the “rights of private property”; there must be an adequate theory of justice in property rights, else any property that some State once decreed to be “private” must now be defended by Libertarians, no matter how unjust the procedure or how mischievous its consequences.

In my view, the proper theory of justice in landed property can be found in John Locke: that it first become private property by the use criterion. This rules out State sales of unused and unowned “public domain” to land speculators in advance of use, as conveying any valid title whatever. This much of the way I proceed with Ingalls and the anarchists. But once use and settlement convey proper title, it seems to me a complete violation of the Spooner-Tucker “law of
equal liberty” to prevent that legitimate owner from selling his land to someone else.

If property rights are the heart and soul of libertarianism, and I believe they are, then anarchists espousing usufruct are closer to our correct position than any Constitutionalist might be, despite their hostility to the term “private property” or our description of Rothbardian property theory as “private property”.

Additionally, I’ve pointed out how leading so-called “anarcho-capitalist” thinkers such as Hans Herman Hoppe acknowledge that the Marxist critique of the status quo is “essentially correct”. I’ve also explained numerous times in informal settings that this hostility of ours to the status quo can and ought to be described as opposing “capitalism” — because capitalism can be understood as state-driven monopolization of capital. Note carefully that it’s not that we only object to monopolization of capital when it’s state-driven. Rather, Rothbardian theory indicates that forming and maintaining an exploitative monopoly of any sort must be a state-driven process.

Now, some or all of these arguments are often rejected out of hand by my libertarian comrades. Verily, with horror. Or, rather, the various points of argument are seldom specifically rejected, let alone refuted — but the conclusion that they add up to, that we are socialists dedicated to the overthrow of capitalism, is dismissed on the basis that it’s incompatible with our existing narrative, rather than our body of theory. We’re used to thinking of ourselves as “capitalists” in the sense of advocacy of a completely free market economy. In this sense “capitalism” is held forth as an unrealized ideal fundamentally at odds with the oppressive status quo. The principal problem with this line of thinking is that the Cold War is over and we lost. When I say “we”, in this case, I mean “radical free market libertarians” rather than the Soviet communists. For an entire lifetime, American civilization was barraged with propaganda from both proponents and opponents of “capitalism” that the American status quo was “capitalism”. When attempting to explain a stateless free market as “capitalism”, besides everything else you need to persuade and convince people of you also face the additional burden of trying to convince people to reject the incredibly deeply ingrained notion that the status quo is “capitalism”. We lost the Cold War. Asserting that the US is not “capitalist” will be regarded as an absurdity.

Libertarian acceptance of the “we’re capitalists and statism is socialism” narrative can be seen as a tribalistic or ceremonial sharing of stories with those we have hoped to influence. A shared mythology makes a tribe. Libertarian theory advocates free markets and it’s irrefutable. On the other hand, libertarian mythology attempts to describe a particular vision of American history as a falling from “capitalist” grace into the burning, sulfurous pit of “socialism”. As a consequence, the more radical critiques of the status quo and history that libertarian theory enables tend to be de-emphasized in the interests of not merely making reformist political alliances, but implicitly appealing to a shared historical narrative to emphasize aspects of libertarianism that (it is hoped) will be found more convincing by those with a right wing mindset. The problem with that approach is that if we, as a movement, are to reject reformism as a strategy and turn toward revolution, we must recognize that the conservative temperament is ill-suited to joining a revolutionary cadre.

We talk about taxes when we should be talking about the revolutionary redistribution of property.